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Summary: In this article, we are firstly going to reread Lacan's famous formula of the 
subject. This formula, “A signifier represents the subject for another signifier”, remains in 
some respects opaque to say the least. Lacan, however, will not cease to repeat it throughout 
his teaching. Secondly, we will read a passage in the Preface to the Phenomenology of the 
Spirit in which Hegel returns to the dialectic between subject and substance. In these 
readings, we will outline that defining the subject comes, for both authors, together with its 
difference from what the subject is seemingly opposed to: structure, substance, Other. 
This difference is central and accentuates above all an impossible relation. Nonetheless, this 
impossible relation does not remain silent. Instead of being simply a relation between two 
terms - which would amount to their difference being only something theoretical (for 
thought) - it is rather that, in struggling with this impossible relation, both terms become 
actual (wirklich) in themselves. For Lacan, the relation between subject and Other fails, 
which makes it ‘not to stop (not) being written’. For Hegel, the relation between subject 
and substance is contradictory, but this contradiction is understood as the subject itself, 
which is nothing but substance’s own restlessness becoming ‘in itself’. 
In order to define the stakes properly, we will pass through Descartes and (Hegel’s reading 
of) Spinoza, whose influence on Lacan and Hegel should not be underestimated. The first 
part of the article investigates how Lacan’s structural formula is an attempt to write the 
Cartesian subject without rendering it into a thinking substance. Descartes does understand 
the subject as a thinking substance from the extended substance, or shortly, as thought 
separated from being (which has become famous as the Cartesian dualism). The second part 
treats how the problems with this dualism – and with Spinoza’s monism which is to be the 
response to these - lead Hegel to write his own topology of the subject in relation to 
substance. The third part is an analysis of a joke during Stalinism which helps to illustrate 
the impossible relation between subject and Other (Lacan) or – which we read as 
overlapping – Hegel’s dialectics between subject and substance. 
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Introduction 
 
Descartes’ certainty of doubting 
 
The notion of the subject has crossed the field of philosophy since 
Descartes. Moreover, Lacan refers to the Cartesian subject in order to 
localise the subject of psychoanalysis. In Seminar XI: The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan specifies that, with 
this term of subject, he is “not designating the living substratum needed 
by this phenomenon of the subject, nor any sort of substance, nor any 
being possessing knowledge in his pathos, his suffering, whether primal 
or secondary, nor even some incarnated logos, but the Cartesian subject, 
who appears at the moment when doubt is recognized as certainty” 
(Lacan, 1998, p. 126). In the same phrase, Lacan confirms that the 
subject of psychoanalysis is the Cartesian subject and denies that the 
subject is “a thinking substance”. This could come as a surprise. It was 
Descartes himself who introduced the idea to think subject as a 
substance. How, then, should we conceive of the Cartesian subject 
without understanding it as a substance? Hegel will turn the formula of 
Descartes - to think subject as substance - around and invites us to think 
substance as subject. This might be of help - not only to grasp substance, 
but also to conceive of the subject as a failure of being substance, and 
therefore as a failure of substance to be itself. Let us first take up what 
Lacan finds in Descartes’ procedure. 
The discovery of the subject can be summed up by two moments 
which are characteristic of the Cartesian approach. Guided by 
methodical doubt - suspending everything that is not absolutely certain 
- Descartes first anticipates certainty1. But soon he stumbles upon the 
fact that there is none, and that only that is certain. The desire for 
certainty stems from dissatisfaction, from doubt, from negativity2. So, 
                                                                    
1. “I will accomplish this by putting aside everything that admits of the least doubt, as if I had 
discovered it to be completely false. I will stay on this course until I know something certain, or, 
if nothing else, until I at least know for certain that nothing is certain. Archimedes sought but 
one firm and immovable point in order to move the entire earth from one place to another. Just 
so, great things are also to be hoped for if I succeed in finding just one thing, however slight, that 
is certain and unshaken.” (Descartes, 1998, p. 63) 
2. “Is it not the very same "I" who now doubts almost everything, who nevertheless understands 
something, who affirms that this one thing is true, who denies other things, who desires to know 
more, who wishes not to be deceived, who imagines many things even against my will, who also 
notices many things which appear to come from the senses? What is there in all of this that is not 
every bit as true as the fact that I exist—even if I am always asleep or even if my creator makes 
every effort to mislead me?” (Descartes, 1998, p. 66) 
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it is only afterwards that Descartes' desire for certainty is transformed 
into the certainty of his desire. In the heart of this paradox - a negativity 
provokes the movement of thought - we find the notions of “subject” in 
Lacan and Hegel. 
 
The Lacanian formula of the subject 
 
For Lacan, “the subject is what is represented by a signifier for 
another signifier” (Lacan, 1998, p. 207). This “definition” of Lacan 
contains a kind of short circuit. Indeed, if one wonders what a subject 
is, Lacan replies that “the subject is what a signifier represents for 
another signifier”3 - and if one wonders, in order to clarify this formula, 
what Lacan means by signifier, we get that “a signifier represents a 
subject for another signifier”4. 
How should we interpret this short circuit? We can at least be sure 
that the very form of the definition is sufficient to determine the terms 
it contains. We do not have to search for something other than the two 
elements “subject” and “signifier” to understand both. The elements 
might therefore be understood from how they relate within this 
definition. At first glance, this formula presents a sequence of two 
signifiers: “the signifier is that which represents a subject for another 
signifier” - “traditionally” named S1 and S2 - and a third element - the 
subject represented therein. We can discern two differences within it. 
The first is the difference between S1 and S2. The second difference, 
which could be described as additional, arises from the fact that the 
subject is only “represented” by the signifier. In other words, the subject 
is not the signifier. Representation stems from the signifier standing for 
the subject. It is a presence, a materialization at the place of the subject 
(who is, moreover, absent), just as a representative of the people is not 
the people but acts in its place. This place exists only in relation to other 
signifiers. So, we have a difference between two signifiers and a 
difference between the subject and the signifier. In what follows, we 
will see that these two coincide.  
 
 
                                                                    
3. “... une certaine définition, celle que je note du S barré [S/] c’est à savoir du sujet, du sujet 
pour autant qu’il n’est rien d’autre que l’effet de signifiant, autrement dit : ‘ce que représente un 
signifiant pour un autre signifiant” (Lacan, 1971-2, p. 124). 
4. “Le signifiant, à l’envers du signe, n’est pas ce qui représente quelque chose pour quelqu’un, 
c’est ce qui représente précisément le sujet pour un autre signifiant” (Lacan, 1961-62, p. 60). 
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The differential nature of the signifier precedes the 
differentiated signifiers 
 
The signifier is the material character of a word. To be an entity, a 
signifier must be identical to itself. Self-identity is a condition for a 
signifier. This self-identity of the signifier is defined by its difference 
from other signifiers and it is this “identity through difference” that is 
necessary for the existence of language. Language, then, consists of a 
set of differential entities. This difference is not only revealed at the 
level of sound, which would mean that the signifiers are inscribed in a 
general acoustic field and that within this field they differentiate 
themselves only quantitatively and not qualitatively and exclusively. 
Indeed, the difference between the signifiers is absolute. If this were not 
the case, the signifier would only differ in its acoustic aspect. The latter 
could neither explain the persistence of the unity of a signifier despite 
the great variety of possible pronunciations, nor the difference between 
homophonic signifiers (e.g., “prey” and “pray”, “bass” (sound) and 
“bass” (fish)). Moreover, when we speak, language breaks down into 
different fragments as a result of the distinction we make between the 
signifiers constituting a phrase. The field of sound does not always 
allow us to make this distinction (in speech, pauses between words are 
often rather vague). The signifier is distinguished by the (exclusive) 
place it occupies in relation to (all) other signifiers.  
Due to the arrival of the second signifier, the first signifier - the 
“master signifier” - diverges from the second signifier (Lacan, 1969-70, 
p. 13). It is only to the extent that a first signifier is followed by a second 
signifier that the first acquires a place for the second signifier - S2 (also 
“Other” or “knowledge” for Lacan)5. The second signifier divides the 
first signifier in its positive presence - its acoustic trace, how it 
represents – and in its place (its difference) for others. By differing from 
others, the signifier comes to represent something for them. Because 
only this way does it begin to represent something that is not simply 
reducible to its acoustic character. Thus, it is the arrival of a second 
signifier that allows the first signifier to retroactively acquire not only 
                                                                    
5. “S’il y a un savoir qui ne se sait pas, je l’ai déjà dit: il est à situer au niveau de S2, soit celui 
que j’appelle «l’autre signifiant». J’ai déjà assez insisté là-dessus l’année dernière: cet autre 
signifiant n’est pas seul, le ventre de l’Autre, du grand A, en est plein. Ce ventre est celui qui 
donne - tel un cheval de Troie monstrueux - l’assise de ce fantasme d’un «savoir-totalité». Il est 
bien clair pourtant que sa fonction implique que quelque chose y vienne frapper du dehors, sans 
ça jamais rien n’en sortira, et Troie ne sera jamais prise.” (Lacan, 1969-70, p. 13) 
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its status of first signifier, but more precisely, its very status of signifier 
as such. It is a genuine event, in fact, it is by pure contingency - the 
arrival of the second signifier - that the difference arises. Their 
difference thus precedes, as it were, the two signifiers that it constitutes 
(the first one by its dependence on a second one, the second one by its 
dependence on the fact there already is one, which it actually only 
constitutes by its arrival). It precedes them in the sense that the 
difference gives the signifier its specific character. 
 
Hegel’s differential nature of subject and predicate  
 
In his Preface to the Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel speaks of 
the “need [among metaphysicians] to represent the Absolute [God, 
substance] as subject” (Hegel, 2018, p. 14). In their propositions: “God 
is eternal”, “God is the moral order of the world”, “God is love”, two 
parts can be distinguished: the grammatical subject and its predicate.  
Hegel insists on the fact that in all these propositions, “God” - 
occupying the first place in the sentence - appears at first sight as “a 
meaningless sound, a mere name” (Hegel, 2018, p. 15). He emphasizes 
the impossibility for metaphysicians of simply affirming God in itself. 
It is necessary for them to add predicates to it. This leads to the term 
“God” being retroactively presented as an S1 in a proposition. Hegel 
underlines that it is only thanks to the predicate (S2) that “the empty 
beginning becomes real knowledge” (Hegel, 2018, p. 15). Once other 
signifiers are added to the first one, the game is on, the S1 represents 
something (what God “really” is, beyond his simple name) for S2 that 
the latter tries to signify. On the one hand, we witness the birth of a 
metonymic movement at the level of S2 that consists of a constant 
addition of signifiers that anticipate the complete meaning of what the 
word “God” represents. On the other hand, we are witnessing the need 
for these predicates (S2) to refer to a grammatical subject (S1), to 
“something else” that they are trying to signify. According to Hegel: 
“one cannot simply ignore the reason why one cannot speak only of the 
eternal, of the moral order of the world, etc., or, as the ancients did, of 
pure concepts, of being, of one, etc.” (Hegel, 2018, p. 15). S2 alone does 
not suffice. Therefore, we will say, with Lacan, that an S2 needs an 
anchor, an S1, something still insufficiently signified that the other 
signifiers aim to signify. Without this “meaningless sound” (S1), the 
developing meaning (S2) would itself be meaningless. It is therefore the 
difference between S1 and S2 which provokes the actuality 
(Wirklichkeit), the movement of the signifying chain.  
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Failure and movement, difference and repetition 
 
The metonymic movement - the addition of different signifiers (S2, 
S3, S4..., movement reduced to S2) - inexorably misses its purpose. In 
running after the gap, the ever-increasing multiplicity of other signifiers 
confirms the gap they were meant to fill. The subject, then, is this failure 
produced by the activity of signification. This endless movement could 
be described as tragic. All efforts to bridge the gap between what S1 
represents and S2's attempt to seize it are in vain, just as Tristan cannot 
bridge his distance with Isolde. What Isolde represents will remain 
forever lost to Tristan - they remain irretrievably separated by structural 
destiny.  
Nevertheless, to take the gap as a mark of destiny (a distance outside 
the two parts it distinguishes) is not the path that Hegel and Lacan will 
follow. This incessant attempt of S2 marks the presence, the actuality 
of the difference between S1 and S2. This actuality of the difference is 
the subject.6 In the same vein, Descartes recognizes in the actuality of 
his thought/doubt himself as subject. The subject is therefore the 
difference between S1 and S2, which we find not only in S1 (the 
distinction between its presence and what it represents) but also in S2, 
as the impossible at work in its repetition. Taking this difference as 
something external to the parts it differentiates, as tragedy does - is 
therefore a disavowal. For when one takes this difference away, one 
loses the constitutive core of both parts and of the subject. 
 
  
                                                                    
6. “Is there not, reproduced here, the element of alienation that I designated for you in the 
foundation of the subject as such? If it is merely at the level of the desire of the Other that man 
can recognize his desire, as desire of the Other, is there not something here that must appear to 
him to be an obstacle to his fading, which is a point at which his desire can never be recognized? 
This obstacle is never lifted, nor ever to be lifted, for analytic experience shows us that it is in 
seeing a whole chain come into play at the level of the desire of the Other that the subject's desire 
is constituted. In the relation of desire to desire, something of alienation is preserved, not with 
the same elements — not with the S1 and S2 of the first dyad of signifiers, from which I deduced 
the formula of the alienation of the subject in my last but one lecture — but with, on the one 
hand, what has been constituted on the basis of primal repression, of the fall, of the 
Unterdrückung, of the binary signifier, and, on the other hand, what appears first as lack in what 
is signified by the dyad of signifiers, in the interval that links them, namely, the desire of the 
Other.” (Lacan, 1998, p. 235-236) 
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The difference between I and substance, between thought and 
being 
 
We find the same movement in the articulation between I and 
substance in Hegel. In what follows, we are interested in a precise 
passage from the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, where Hegel 
develops his topology in an extremely reduced and precise manner. 
Since the Hegelian and Lacanian terms are not the same, we will 
concentrate especially on the analogy of the differences between the 
terms, in order to be able to compare the Hegelian topology with the 
Lacanian one. 
“The inequality that takes place in consciousness between the I and 
the substance which is its object, is their difference, the negative itself. 
It can be regarded as the lack [Mangel] of the two, but it is their very 
soul, that is, it is what moves them [das Bewegende derselben]. This is 
why some ancients understood the void as what makes things move [das 
Bewegende], in conceiving what makes things move as the negative. 
But they did not yet grasp this negative as the self [das Selbst].  
However much this negative [between I and substance] now initially 
appears as the inequality between the I and the object, still it is just as 
much the inequality of the substance with itself. What seems to take 
place outside of the substance, to be an activity directed against it, is its 
own doing, and substance shows that it is essentially subject.” (Hegel, 
2018, p. 23)  
In the first part of this passage, we encounter two opposing terms: 
“I” and “substance”. The difference between them is typical in 
representational philosophies according to which “I” and “substance”, 
“what I think” and “what is”, subject and Other are found in two 
'parallel worlds' without interaction. Hegel here attempts to overcome 
this distinction, not by bridging the gap between the terms, but by 
considering the distinction itself (inequality, difference) as a positive 
feature, as “what makes things move” or the “self”. The passage might 
be best understood as an answer to Descartes and Spinoza. Indeed, after 
his discovery of the subject, Descartes baptises the subject into a 
“thinking substance” (res cogitans, I) - a self-subsistent thing excluded 
from the “extended substance” (res extensa, outer world): “For [even] 
when I think that a stone is a substance, or at least a thing capable of 
existing of itself, and that I am a substance also, although I conceive 
that I am a thing that thinks and not one that is extended, and that the 
stone on the other hand is an extended thing which does not think, and 
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that thus there is a notable difference between the two conceptions — 
they seem, nevertheless, to agree in this, that both represent 
substances.”  
 
Descartes’ dualism, the subject in quarantine 
 
Descartes differentiates between two substances: thought and being. 
Following Descartes, these two entities do not need anything else but 
themselves to subsist. The problem underlying this type of distinction 
is that here Descartes does not take into account the fact that it is thought 
itself that makes the very division between the terms (this is why Hegel 
writes that “the inequality takes place in consciousness”). Thought 
happens to be both one of the two terms and the agent that takes into 
account their difference. In fact, as soon as one differentiates between 
“thought” and “being”, one realizes that this very distinction goes 
beyond the distinguished parts. It is through this excess of division that 
Descartes first discovers the subject. To consider the two substances as 
separate from each other cancels his own discovery. Let us return, in 
detail, to the manner in which he discovers the subject in order to 
underline how the act of division marks the very presence of the subject.  
As we have seen, systematic doubt leads Descartes to distinguish his 
thoughts between two distinct categories: the category of doubt and that 
of certainty. Descartes bets on the existence of a certainty that would be 
beyond all doubt.7 He quickly realizes that doubt and certainty do not 
simply make “two” (like the two he assumes when he considers thought 
substance and extended substance as two entities). The more Descartes 
tries to assign certain thoughts to the categories of doubt or certainty, 
the emptier the category of certainty turns out to be. When Descartes is 
confronted with this gap, only one certainty remains, that of the division 
proper to the action of his thought.8 He discovers the fact that his own 
doubt comes from the lack of certainty to begin with. Descartes 
therefore recognises in the emptiness of his result the excessive activity 
of his own thought. I, who think, must therefore exist. The subject 
cannot but exist, in fact, it is by stumbling against the constant absence 
                                                                    
7. “I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to discover one thing only 
which is certain and indubitable” (Descartes, 2012, p. 71). 
8. “Am I not that being who now doubts nearly everything, who nevertheless understands certain 
things, who affirms that one only is true, who denies all the others, who desires to know more, is 
averse from being deceived, who imagines many things, sometimes indeed despite his will, and 
who perceives many likewise, as by the intervention of the bodily organs?” (Descartes, 2012, p. 
14) 
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of certainty that the certainty of the frustration of the one who tries to 
get rid of it appears to him.  
For the first time in the history of philosophy, and this is Descartes' 
step, certainty has nothing to do with a certainty that would be found in 
an object external to thought. In fact, Descartes argues that it does not 
matter whether he actually sees an object or whether he simply thinks 
he sees it.9 It does not matter whether he is doing the right thing or not, 
or whether he knows what he is doing. What matters is that the thinking, 
the doubt, the separation and the division “really” happen. So it is not a 
matter of certainty as to content. On the contrary, the content remains 
uncertain. This does not prevent the form of uncertainty to exist, and it 
is this form that will enable him to catch a glimpse of the existence of 
the thinker.  
It is in the same vein that the form of thought separates itself from 
the content, res cogitans from res extensa, the subject from the outer 
world. But this dualism again creates a problem for thought. Is the 
subject condemned to remain in a formal quarantine, separated from the 
outside world? How can a thinker get out of this subjective or formal 
cage? Is the other inevitably cut off from me? 
 
Spinoza’s monist substance-God: difference identified 
 
Post-Cartesian philosophies are confronted with this problem. If the 
subject is certain of herself, how can she consider what remains outside 
of it? According to Hegel, Spinoza is the one who best articulates a 
(beginning of) solution to this problem: 
“The simple thought of Spinoza's idealism is this: The true is simply 
and solely the one substance, whose attributes are thought and extension 
or nature: and only this absolute unity is reality, it alone is God. It is, as 
with Descartes, the unity of thought and Being, or that which contains 
the Notion of its existence in itself. [...] With Descartes corporeality and 
the thinking 'I' are altogether independent Beings; this independence of 
the two extremes is done away with in Spinozism by their becoming 
moments of the one absolute Being.” (Hegel, 1892-6) 
If Descartes is sure - because he doubts - of the production of his 
thought, he finds a way to attribute being - or at least existence - to the 
process of his thought. He can thus conclude: “I think therefore I am” 
                                                                    
9. “it follows much more evidently that I myself exist. For it could happen that what I see is not 
truly wax. It could happen that I have no eyes with which to see anything. But it is utterly 
impossible that, while I see or think I see (I do not now distinguish these two), I who think am 
not something.” (Descartes, 1998, p. 69) 
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Therefore, even if Descartes radically distinguishes being from 
thinking, Spinoza points out that, on the contrary, the peculiarity of 
Descartes' knot resides in the fact that thinking and being intersect. For 
Descartes, the thought of the one who thinks about “being” is not itself 
the being he thinks about. Nevertheless, the thinker can grasp that his 
thinking itself implies being, actuality, the reason he can say “I think 
therefore I am” in the first place. Being is therefore no longer on the 
Other Side, it coincides with the activity of thought itself.  
In this way, Spinoza “overcomes” the Cartesian distinction by 
affirming the absolute identity of thought and being, what he calls 
substance (or God). Instead of a dualism, we thus obtain a monism, 
which is based on identity, on the overlapping of thought and being. 
When that I think is equivalent to what I think, in other words, when 
idea and matter, form and content coincide, we are in the reign of 
Spinozist truth. For him, mere understanding - who understands its 
thinking as separated from being - is therefore not yet the realm of truth.  
 
Hegel’s trouble in Spinoza’s paradise: the subject’s distance to 
substance is also substance’s distance with itself 
 
This is precisely where Hegel sees the problem with Spinoza's 
theory. “How does it come that besides the Deity there now appears 
understanding which applies to absolute substance the two forms of 
thought and extension? and whence come these two forms themselves?” 
(Hegel, 1892-6) If we start from one substance where thought and being 
are identical, how then to account for understanding,10 or for the fact 
that their difference is formerly been made? Difference, following 
Hegel, is a prerequisite for the identification of a thing. The principle of 
identity (A is A) requires two A's in order to be able to identify them. 
Split is therefore internal to identity.11 Spinoza considers this preceding 
difference as an epiphenomenon, an error, an “inferior stage” 
hierarchised under the superior stage of identity. For Hegel, on the 
contrary, this type of reasoning is itself the error: 
“... However much this negative [between I and substance] now 
initially appears as the inequality between the I and the object, still it is 
just as much the inequality of the substance with itself. What seems to 
                                                                    
10. “Understanding” has to be understood as the mode of thinking that only separates and 
analyzes, but does not take the identity of what it separates into account, which “reason” does.  
11. Note how this is similar to Lacan’s idea of the unity of a split: “You will grant me that the 
one that is introduced by the experience of the unconscious is the one of the split, of the stroke, 
of rupture.” (Lacan, 1998, p. 26) 
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take place outside of the substance, to be an activity directed against it, 
is its own doing, and substance shows that it is essentially subject.” 
(Hegel, 2018, p. 23)  
The law of identity or non-contradiction within Aristotelian logic 
asserts that “something cannot be at the same time A and non-A”. 
Hegel’s thesis, on the contrary, is that contradiction is what makes 
something actual (wirklich). “All things are in themselves 
contradictory” (Hegel, 2010, p. 381). The contradiction - something 
being A and non-A at the same time, being itself and its negation - 
provokes a thing’s internal state of restlessness12. If Hegel asserts “the 
inequality of the substance with itself”, or substance being substance 
and non-substance, this should be read as substance’s proper 
contradiction, that which makes substance move. Instead of Spinoza’s 
substance as absolute Identity (A is A), Hegel’s substance presents itself 
therefore as an actual contradiction. Substance is at once itself - identity 
- and its opposite moment - subject. 
Hegel therefore does not consider “understanding” - the experience 
of the subject separated from being, as we have seen - to be external to 
the absolute identity of substance. On the contrary, if the subject fails 
to understand the substance, he already understands the secret of the 
substance itself. 
Descartes can affirm that he exists as a subject, but he fails to grasp 
what that subject is that exists. He comes up against an impasse: that of 
not being able to think the subject as substance. For Hegel, this very 
conception prevents us from thinking the essence of substance. On the 
contrary, he asserts that “substance [...] is essentially subject” (Hegel, 
2018, p. 23) Instead of asking what substance would be outside of the 
limits of the subject and of our understanding, Hegel thus inverts the 
question: What is substance if the subject emerges from his inability to 
grasp it, from his inability to become one with it? For Hegel, this 
impossibility is in itself the clue to substance. We find this point in the 
Hegelian adage that Zizek likes to quote: “The secrets of the Egyptians 
are also secrets to the Egyptians.”13 Instead of preventing access to the 
                                                                    
12. “Internal self-movement, self-movement proper, drive in general (the appetite or nisus of the 
monad, the entelechy of the absolutely simple essence) is likewise nothing else than that 
something is, in itself, itself and the lack of itself (the negative), in one and the same respect. 
Abstract self- identity is not yet vitality; but the positive, since implicitly it is negativity, goes 
out of itself and sets its alteration in motion. Something is alive, therefore, only to the extent that 
it contains contradiction within itself: indeed, force is this, to hold and endure contradiction 
within.” (Hegel, 2010, p. 382) 
13. “In the same way in which we try to explain this meaning to ourselves, it might have been 
clear and intelligible as a meaning to the insight of the Egyptians themselves. But the Egyptian 
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substance, the subject is the preferred means of contact with it. This 
way, Hegel asserts that the absolute identity proper to substance is only 
possible when one counts one's own experience of being excluded from 
substance, as the essence of substance itself. 
If the task of philosophy is to bridge the distance to its object, then 
one could consider substance as the mother of all philosophical 
concepts, since it promises the identity between thinking and being. If 
substance is the identity between thinking and being, then thinking 
substance is the same as being substance. To think substance correctly 
is to “experience” it, that is, to grasp the point where substance no 
longer presents itself only for us, but also in itself. 
So it is more than an analogy to consider substance as Lacan's Other. 
If desire of the subject is the desire of and for the Other, the lack of the 
Other provokes the metonymic movement of the subject's speech while 
the subject's activity only repeats the lack in the Other. (Lacan, 1998, p. 
235-236) Subject is the effect of the Other's lack. In Hegelese: the 
inequality between subject and substance is the inequality of substance 
with itself. 
 
Concluding illustrations: the first time as tragedy, the second 
as farce 
 
Marx wrote that “Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and 
personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. 
He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce” (Marx, 
1963, p. 15). 
Although we have previously stressed the tragic structural destiny 
that separates Tristan and Isolde, we cannot ignore Marx’s reading of 
Hegel. So let us ask ourselves: how can Tristan's tragedy be repeated as 
a farce? If Isolde embodies for Tristan the point to be reached by 
crossing the distance between them, one can raise Isolde to the rank of 
“substance” (or Lacan’s “Woman”) for Tristan. If he manages to bridge 
the distance that separates him from Isolde, would he not lose his very 
love? What if the object of Tristan's love was not the person of Isolde, 
but the distance itself? One could perfectly imagine a comic scene in 
which Tristan randomly bumps into Isolde and tells her about his great 
                                                                    
symbols, as we saw at the very beginning, contain implicitly much, explicitly nothing. There are 
works undertaken with the attempt to make them clear to themselves, yet they do not get beyond 
the struggle after what is absolutely evident. In this sense we regard the Egyptian works of art as 
containing riddles, the right solution of which is in part unattained not only by us, but generally 
by those who posed these riddles to themselves.” (Hegel, 1998, p. 360) 
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love to kill time without recognizing her, until the moment Isolde says 
to him “but Tristan, I am Isolde?”. Wouldn't Isolde fade away 
completely, divided between the woman Tristan tells about and the one 
Tristan speaks to? 
A Soviet joke about Karl Radek - a historical figure of Bolshevism 
who never stopped to criticize the Stalinist regime from within the 
Communist Party - is a perfect illustration of this point.14 In the eyes of 
the people, the figure of Karl Radek was ambiguous. They could not 
decide whether he was a traitor or a true Communist. The joke goes as 
follows. 
In Gulag, two prisoners meet. One asks the other why he was 
arrested... The prisoner answers, “I said Karl Radek is a revolutionary.” 
He returns the question to the other, who answers, “I said Karl Radek 
is counter-revolutionary.” Confused, they realize there's a third person 
to whom they ask the same question: “And you, what are you here for?” 
To which he replies, “I am Karl Radek.”  
Now let us read it again with the definition of the subject (Lacan) 
and the question of substance (Hegel) in mind. Karl Radek is the name, 
the S1 representing the subject. The first two answers (S2) anticipate 
the meaning of what S1, Karl Radek, represents. The first two types of 
answers (S2) are contradictory, but this does not ruin the promise of a 
coherent meaning of what S1 represents. The secret of Karl Radek 
remains stuck on the Other Side. When Karl Radek announces “I am 
Karl Radek”, his bodily presence does not seem to be a solution to the 
contradiction between the first two answers, on the contrary, it adds 
nothing, it only affirms this contradiction as such. The very 
contradiction seems to be the subject represented by the name “Karl 
Radek”. 
What now of the substance - the Other - in this joke? Far from merely 
underlining the way in which the subject erupts, this joke points to the 
system shared by the different protagonists. Karl Radek cannot be 
correctly categorized as either a “traitor” or a “communist”. This 
distinction is crucial in the Stalinist era: the betrayal of communism 
must be carefully separated from communism itself in order to create a 
“truly existing socialism”. The very act of distinguishing between 
communism and anti-communism exceeds the two resulting parts. This 
is the very substance of Stalinism. The system “works”, moves and 
determines itself by excluding what does not belong to it. 
                                                                    
14. For the joke and its historical context, see (Lewis, 2009, p. 58-62). 
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Karl Radek extends the field of distinction proper to Stalinism by 
including the reference point from which this differentiation is made 
(Stalin). He obstructs the smooth functioning of the system by the 
system's own means (“what seems to take place outside of the 
substance, to be an activity directed against it, is its own doing” (Hegel, 
2018, p. 23)). Stalinist communism thus seems to be embodied in the 
ambiguous figure of Karl Radek. Karl Radek is - by its impossible 
categorization - the name of this very categorization. He thus embodies 
not only the subject but also the constitutive gap in the Other, the 
contradiction within the substance that makes substance both possible 
and impossible. The joke thus reveals not only the aphanisis of the 
master signifier (Karl Radek), which turns out to be internal to S2's 
failed attempt to signify S1, but also marks the productive contradiction 
inherent in substance itself (“the inequality of substance with itself”). 
Thus, the relation between subject and substance (and the relation of 
substance with itself) is not a relation of identity (as Spinoza supposes), 
of indifference (like Descartes’ thinking substance and extended 
substance), of proximity, of opposition, of proportion or of mere 
difference. The problem then is how to theorize a relationship that 
cannot be positively described? Lacan sought different ways of 
expressing this throughout his teaching: the difference between S1 and 
S2, the moebius band where the two faces turn out to be one, the sexual 
non-relation, the Klein bottle, etc. For Hegel, the agitation at work in 
each of his concepts amounts to absolute negativity. Its presence can be 
discerned in notions such as “the coincidence of opposites”, 
“contradiction”, “the negation of negation”, the formal distortion within 
the content. After having affirmed the aforementioned inequality of 
substance with itself, Hegel affirms that “with this, the Phenomenology 
of the Spirit comes to its conclusion.” (Hegel, 2018, p. 23) The 
Phenomenology of the Spirit concludes with the famous “absolute 
knowing”. This prompts us to read absolute knowledge as the moment 
when one understands one's own lack as the lack at the heart of 
substance itself. One may therefore wonder why Lacan categorically 
rejects the Hegelian notion of “absolute knowing”15. Hegel's “absolute 
knowing” could be much closer to what Lacan calls the inexistence of 
                                                                    
15. For instance: “Mettrons-nous cet être en balance avec celui que Hegel comme sujet a forgé, 
d'être le sujet qui tient sur l'histoire le discours du savoir absolu? On se souvient qu'il nous 
témoigne en avoir éprouvé la tentation de la folie. Et notre voie n'est-elle pas celle qui la 
surmonte, d'aller jusqu'à la vérité de la vanité de ce discours. N'avançons pas ici notre doctrine 
de la folie. Car cette excursion eschatologique n'est là que pour désigner de quelle béance se 
séparent, la freudienne de l'hégelienne, ces deux relations du sujet au savoir.” (Lacan, 1966, p. 
802) 
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the Other, than he could admit. Nevertheless, and this could be the 
conclusion, from there a fruitful reading of Hegel with Lacan can be 
made. 
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